Brazil’s mineral resources are back at the international negotiating table. At COP31 in Antalya, Turkey, the government raised an old industrial question with new urgency: why export mineral resources only to buy back technologically advanced products made from them?
At the Strategic Minerals: From Transition to New Industry event organized by ApexBrasil on November 11, Brazil’s Minister of Development, Industry, Trade and Services, Márcio Elias Rosa, argued that the extraction of rare earths and other critical minerals should be tied to manufacturing inside Brazil.
“We want extraction to support industrialization,” the minister said, in a translation of his remarks in Portuguese.
That ambition places products and components, rather than ore alone, at the center of mineral policy. The test for businesses, researchers and investors will be practical: which links of the supply chain can Brazil develop competitively, who will finance them and how much finished material will actually leave the factory?
What did Brazil announce about rare earths at COP31?
The government reiterated its intention to turn critical minerals into higher-value products, linking mining, research, refining and manufacturing. The minister cited permanent magnets and batteries as strategically important industries for the energy transition and called for private investment and international partners.
There is a technical distinction worth preserving. Rare earths comprise 17 chemical elements, including neodymium and praseodymium, which can be used in high-performance permanent magnets. Lithium-ion batteries employ different materials depending on their chemistry, including lithium and graphite and, in some designs, nickel or cobalt. A single industrial policy may address both supply chains, but they are not interchangeable.
The COP31 statement followed two institutional decisions. On September 16, 2026, Brazil enacted Law No. 15,506, establishing its National Critical and Strategic Minerals Policy. On November 5, the responsible council approved a list of 27 priority mineral groups, assigning rare earths to Class I, the highest-priority tier, alongside graphite, lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, manganese, silicon and uranium.
A law, a priority list and a conference speech describe the direction of public policy. They do not, by themselves, establish a new operating magnet factory or additional industrial output.
From mineral deposit to magnet: where is value created?
Turning rare-earth material into a magnet requires much more than mining. First, a deposit must be explored and shown to be economically viable. Extraction and beneficiation are followed by chemical separation, refining and the production of materials that meet industrial specifications. Alloys and magnets then require their own equipment, technical expertise, customers and quality controls.
Every stage carries different risks, costs, suppliers and margins. A country may operate a mine and still depend on foreign facilities to separate oxides, produce metal alloys or make the components used in motors and industrial equipment.
That is the gap Brazil’s policy is intended to narrow. Priority status may encourage investment, but manufacturing capacity ultimately depends on reliable technology, efficient scale, long-term financing, electricity, logistics and purchase agreements.
The starting point is still modest. According to Brazil’s National Mining Agency (ANM), the country produced 326 metric tons of rare-earth oxide concentrate in 2025. That figure measures a mineral product, not domestically manufactured magnets. Thousands of areas were also under mineral exploration. An exploration area, an economically recoverable reserve and an industrial operation represent different stages of development.
What does the new law change for investors and companies?
The National Critical and Strategic Minerals Policy created support instruments and established the National Council for the Industrialization of Critical and Strategic Minerals (CIMCE). Inclusion on the council’s priority list is part of the framework governing access to public programs, including the Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund.
The legislation authorizes a federal contribution of up to R$2 billion to the guarantee fund, subject to legal and budgetary conditions. This is a ceiling, not money already disbursed. Tax incentives are also provided for future years, subject to eligibility and the applicable conditions.
Companies considering exploration, processing or manufacturing should examine three questions. Which stage of the chain will the project operate? What evidence establishes its commercial viability? And which environmental, financing and regulatory requirements must be met?
Buyers matter too. A chemical separation plant without reliable customers for its output may face risks comparable to those of a mine lacking transportation infrastructure.
Environmental responsibility and the investment competition
At COP31, Elias Rosa associated mineral industrialization with environmental protection, social responsibility, circular-economy practices and decarbonization. Brazil’s electricity mix, with its significant renewable component, may offer a competitive advantage for some industrial processes.
The outcome depends on the plant being built. Rare-earth separation and refining can require substantial water, chemical reagents, electricity and waste management. Comparing emissions across countries therefore demands a defined product, system boundary, power source and methodology. A percentage cited in a speech cannot stand in for the environmental assessment of a particular project.
On November 12, the government changed CIMCE’s executive committee composition to include the ministries responsible for the environment and climate change, mines and energy, and foreign affairs. The adjustment puts industrial decisions in closer contact with environmental oversight, energy policy and diplomacy, matters of particular importance to international investors.
The minister also called for partnerships with several countries. Such agreements could increase Brazil’s negotiating options, provided financing, sales contracts, ownership structures and technology transfer are addressed transparently.
How will we know whether manufacturing has really begun?
Speeches and memoranda can explain ambition, but measurable industrial milestones tell a different story. Evidence of progress includes registered and approved projects, financing actually contracted, environmental permits issued, construction completed, production lines commissioned and industrial sales recorded.
Those milestones help distinguish announced investments from projects under construction and commercial production. They also reveal whether the country is advancing into technically demanding stages such as chemical separation, refining and magnetic material manufacturing.
NEODY previously examined why Brazil has so many rare-earth resources yet produces so little and what its new mineral law changes for projects and investors. COP31 added a clear political objective: use Brazil’s mineral resources as the foundation for an internationally competitive industrial base.
Access to the raw material gives Brazil a seat at the negotiating table. Manufacturing the product the world wants will determine how much value that seat can generate.
NEODY Rare Earths series
This report is part of NEODY’s ongoing coverage of Brazilian mineral resources, industrial policy, rare-earth separation and refining, permanent magnets and global supply chains. Read the Portuguese-language NEODY rare-earths manifesto and explore rare earths in Brazil’s digital economy.
Sources and editorial method
This report draws on the minister’s COP31 statement reproduced by Agência Gov and the ministry, Law No. 15,506/2026, the council’s priority list and its November 12 governance change, together with ANM production data. Economic implications are NEODY editorial analysis. Announced industrial ambitions have not been counted as production.




